Extant research has found that firms are increasingly substituting dividends with share repurchases. This substitution effect is largely attributed to the flexibility offered by share repurchases.. This paper tests two types of flexibilities associated with repurchases-operational and reactive flexibility. Operational flexibility refers to the choice between share repurchases and dividends. Firms consider dividends to be rigid and share repurchases to be flexible. Without fear of an adverse market reaction firms can choose not repurchase shares, which is not possible with dividends. Reactive flexibility refers to the flexibility offered by share repurchases to alter an ongoing open market share repurchase program. Using the financial crisis period of 2008-2009 as a natural experiment we test for evidence of both operational and reactive flexibilities associated with share repurchases. We find that share repurchasers are more flexible than dividend payers thereby proving operational flexibility. We also find that share repurchasers have the ability to alter their ongoing open market share repurchase program, thereby proving reactive flexibility.
I. Introduction
Firms distribute cash through dividends and through share repurchases. Over the last two decades share repurchases have become increasingly popular and dividends less so. One of the key differentiating factors between dividends and share repurchases is the potential flexibility offered by the latter. Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) survey financial executives and find that managers like the flexibility of share repurchases and dislike the rigidity of dividends.
Respondents were asked to pick between dividends and share repurchases if they were initiating a payout. Two-thirds of managers prefer share repurchases over dividends. Due to the rigidity of dividends, firms shy away from dividend initiations. Once a firm initiates a dividend, it is expected to continue to pay dividends. Initiating firms are expected to build the credibility of paying regular dividends in future periods. This expectation acts as a deterrent for non-dividend paying firms to initiate dividend payouts. However, share repurchases are not viewed as being subject to a similar expectation. While most managers agree that reducing dividends will draw negative abnormal market reaction, only a small proportion of financial executives consider that reducing repurchases will have such adverse consequences 1 .
Consistent with the reservations expressed by managers on dividends, Fama and French (2001) note that the proportion of firms paying cash dividends has decreased drastically. This is the result of a lower propensity to pay dividends; this after controlling for determinants of dividends including profitability, investment opportunities, and firm size. According to the paper, one of reasons for the lower propensity to pay dividends is that the characteristics of publicly listed firms have tilted towards characteristics of firms that have never initiated a dividend -small, low earnings, and high investments. They also state that the perceived value 1 Refer table 3 of Brav et.al. (2005) from paying dividends has also declined. Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) find that share repurchases have increased in prominence compared to dividends. Grullon and Michaely (2002) document that large, established firms have not decreased their dividend payouts, but they display a higher propensity to payout cash through shares repurchases. Together, these two papers find that increase in share repurchases can explain the decreasing propensity to pay dividends, which also corroborates the survey evidence in Brav et.al, (2005) . However, none of these studies explicitly test the flexibility hypothesis.
The flexibility offered by share repurchases could also be one of the reasons why firms choose to repurchase shares instead of paying dividends.
Flexibility in a firm's payout policy can be configured into three types -operational, reactive, and timing. Operational flexibility refers to the ability of firms to decide whether to distribute cash to shareholders or to keep it in the firm (e.g., for investments). The final type of flexibility of share repurchases is the timing flexibility, which relates to the market timing of the actual open market repurchases. Timing flexibility accord managers the benefit of using their superior information to buy the stated amount of shares (or dollar value) when the market value of the shares drop below the intrinsic value of the firm. Research has already tested the timing flexibility and has found mixed evidence on the market timing ability of managers (Bozanic (2010) ; Cesari, Espenlaub, Khurshed and Simkovic (2010) ; Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2007) ; Cook, Krigman and Leach (2004 ) ), hence we will not test the timing flexibility of share repurchases. In this paper we test the operational flexibility and reactive flexibility of share repurchases, which heretofore have not been tested. Specifically, we use the financial crisis period of 2008-2009 as a natural experiment to study operational and reactive flexibility associated with stock repurchases. To conduct our tests we classify firms into several predefined groups according to their payout policy: regular repurchasers, regular dividend payers, and occasional repurchasers.
In brief our findings are as follows. The proportion of regular repurchasing firms that reduced their payouts during the financial crisis is greater than the proportion of regular dividend paying firms that reduced their payouts. The stock price performance of regular repurchasing firms that did not announce repurchase plans (regular repurchasing firms that reduced their repurchase announcements) is better than the stock price performance of regular dividend paying firms that reduced their payouts. We also find that the amount spent on actual repurchases (actual number of shares repurchased) during the financial crisis is lower than those during period prior to the financial crisis.
Overall, the results support the flexibility theory. The regular repurchasing firms are flexible enough that a larger proportion of them were able to lower repurchase announcements.
The market reaction to dividend reductions were more severe than the market reaction to reduction in repurchase announcements, which lends credence to the flexibility theory. The regular (and occasional repurchasing) firms were nimble enough that they reacted to the financial crisis by reducing their actual repurchases. Finally, the results indicate that the market does not differentiate between firms that completed their announced repurchase programs and firms that did not complete their announced repurchase programs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the hypotheses. Section III describes the sample construction process. Section IV presents the data and empirical results and section V concludes.
II. Hypothesis Development

A. Operational Flexibility
Operational flexibility refers to the ability of a firm to alter its payout policy over time once the choice has been made to follow either a dividend paying or share repurchasing policy.
Therefore, operational flexibility is a test of flexibility between dividend paying firms and repurchasing firms. As noted earlier, managers believe that dividends are regular and inflexible unlike share repurchases. Dividend payments induce an expectation of stable future dividends, and any reduction in dividends is met with an adverse market reaction. On the other hand, open market share repurchases by their very nature offer an element of flexibility. Open market repurchasers do not have the obligation to deliver on their announcements hence it is logical for a repurchaser to believe that open market share repurchase programs will not create an expectation of future repurchases. Further, the firm may also believe that any reduction in an open market repurchase program will not receive the same adverse market reaction as a dividend reduction.
The challenge in testing the operational flexibility hypothesis is to examine a situation or event when this inherent operational flexibility between dividends and share repurchasers comes into play. The financial crisis of 2008-2009 provides such an opportunity. The financial crisis is an exogenous economic event that affected all firms. By examining how dividend payers and share repurchasers altered their payout policy in response to the financial crisis we should be able to shed light on the inherent operational flexibility between the two disbursement methods.
An effective test also requires that we compare otherwise similar firms. This suggests that regular dividend payers (RD firms) be compared to regular repurchasing (RR) firms rather than to all repurchasers. Research has found that the firm characteristics of RR firms are similar to RD firms. Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) find that frequent repurchasers are generally larger, have higher market-to-book ratios, and have lower volatility of operating income. Skinner (2008) on the other hand finds that firms that pay dividends regularly are large, mature, and profitable.
Hence the comparison between RR firms and RD firms is a logical one. For testing the reactive flexibility we also consider the case of firms that are occasional repurchasers (OR). The classification of firms into RD, RR, OR firms will be detailed in section III. 
III. Sample Construction
This section details the selection of the sample period and the classification of firms into different categories such as RD firms, RR firms, OR firms.
A. Study Period
The overall period of study can be split into the firm classification period, pre-crisis period, and financial crisis period. We first start by identifying the financial crisis period and then work backward to include the pre-crisis period and the classification period. As mentioned during hypothesis development, the financial crisis period plays a pivotal role in our ability to test the flexibility hypothesis. It is important to identify the starting and the ending points of the financial crisis because the ensuing payout policy of firms will be drastically affected by those time points. When fears of the crisis solidified, firms may have reacted by implementing payout cuts and, conversely, when the crisis eased its grip, firms may have resumed their payouts.
Observations before the starting point of the financial crisis will be classified as the pre-crisis period and the period between the starting point and the ending point of the financial crisis will constitute the financial crisis period. For testing purposes we identify a pre-crisis 'normal' period against which the behavior during the financial crisis period is assessed. We define 
B. Classification of Firms
Proper classification of firms into different payout categories (RD firms, RR firms, and OR firms) is of considerable importance in our quest to test the flexibility hypothesis.
Misclassification of firms also has the potential to adversely influence the conclusions of this study. Our classification algorithm uses Skinner's (2008) (2008) is the identification of the emergence of distinct group of payers.
These groups consist of firms that pay only dividends, firms that only repurchase shares, and so on. Firms that regularly pay dividends were defined as firms that made no repurchases but paid dividends for at least 6 years. Firms that make regular repurchases were defined as firms that paid no dividends but made repurchases in at least 6 years. Firms that occasionally make repurchases were defined as firms that paid no dividend but made repurchases up to a maximum of 5 years. Though Skinner's methodology can be adopted for our study, it is subject to two major shortcomings. Firstly, the adoption of the Skinner (2008) To begin with, we devise the payout choice (PC) ratio, which is defined as the dollar amount distributed through dividends divided by the dollar amount of shares repurchased in a given year. The PC ratio also acknowledges the fact that firms pay dividends as well as repurchase shares. A firm could still be categorized as a dividend payer if the majority of the payouts are distributed through dividends. By using the PC ratio we aim to capture any recent changes in the payout nature of the firms particularly any trends related to the substitution effect.
The proponents of the substitution hypothesis have found that dividends are being substituted by share repurchases. In other words, a regular dividend paying firm could have altered its payout strategy over time to favor share repurchases as the chosen method to distribute cash. To acknowledge the substitution hypothesis, the payout mix, and to place significance on the most recent payout behavior we define RD, RR and OR firms as follows. RR Condition 3 -Average PC ratio for the last three payouts should be less than 1.
If a firm fails to meet condition RR2 but meets condition RR1 and RR3 then the firm is classified as an OR firm.
Additionally, a firm is classified as an OR firm if it meets the following conditions -OR Condition 1. Announced repurchases up to a maximum of 4 years during 1984 -2005 period.
OR Condition 2. Average PC ratio for those payouts should be less than 1.
The data sources and empirical methodologies adopted to test the operational and reactive flexibility and the results obtained thereof are detailed in the following section.
IV. Data and Empirical Methodology A. Data
The requisite data for our study is collected from multiple sources. For classification purposes we need data on the number of times a firm distributed dividends, the number of times a firm repurchased shares, and the annual ratio of the amount distributed through dividends to the amount spent on share repurchases; we collect the dividend information from CRSP and share repurchases data from COMPUSTAT.
The first hypothesis includes a comparison of the ratio of RD firms that reduced dividends to the ratio of RR firms that did not announce share repurchases, and to the ratio of RR firms that announced lower share repurchase amounts. The second (third) hypothesis is the comparison of stock price performance during the financial crisis period of RD firms that reduced dividends during the financial crisis to the stock price performance of RR firms that did not announce repurchases (announced lower repurchase amounts) during the financial crisis. The first three hypotheses require data on dividends distributed and share repurchase announcement amounts. Dividend data for the first three hypotheses is collected from CRSP and the share repurchase announcement amounts data is collected from SDC Platinum. The missing repurchase announcements in the SDC Platinum database were identified and added to the sample by searching through the 8-K filings.
Hypothesis four compares the actual amount spent on share repurchase (actual number of shares repurchased) by RR and OR firms during the financial crisis period to those prior to the financial crisis period. Hypothesis five compares the stock price performance during the financial crisis period of RR firms (and OR firms) that completed their share repurchase programs announced during the financial crisis to those that did not complete their share repurchase programs announced during the financial crisis. To test hypothesis four and five we need data on actual share repurchases. Previous studies mostly relied on the COMPUSTAT or CRSP data to identify actual share repurchases in any given period. Banyi, Dyl and Kahle (2008) prove that most of the prevalent methods which rely on COMPUSTAT and CRSP data (Fama and French (2001) could be facing volatile cash flows, which may account for their high cash ratio. RD firms have the highest leverage followed by RR firms and then by OR firms. All three types of firms spend more than 2% of their total assets on capital expenditures. Measured by the median ROA, RR firms appear to be most profitable followed by RD firms and by OR firms. Measured by median ROE, RD firms appears to be most profitable followed by RR firms and by OR firms. The median Market-to-book (MB) ratio is highest for RR firms followed closely by RD firms and then by OR firms.
B. Summary Statistics
[Insert Table I about here]
C. Empirical Methodology and Results
This sub-section presents the empirical methodologies and results for each of the hypotheses. Hypotheses one through three provide tests of operational flexibility and hypotheses four and five provide tests of reactive flexibility.
C.1. Hypothesis One
Hypothesis one tests whether the proportion RR firms that reduced payouts during the financial crisis period are greater than the proportion of RD firms that reduced payouts during the financial crisis period. RR firms that reduced repurchases are measured in two ways. The first measure considers only cases where the firms did not announce any open market repurchase programs during the financial crisis period while the second measure considers both firms that did not announce any repurchase programs plus firms that announced repurchases but at a lower repurchase amount than their pre-crisis levels. In the case of RD firms, the number of RD firms that reduced dividends includes firms that omitted dividends plus the firms that announced a lower dividend than their pre-crisis levels. The test consists of comparing the proportions for the RD and RR firms by way of a Chi-square test. 
is a dummy variable that takes values of 1 if the firm is a RD firm that reduced dividends and 0 if it is a RR firm that reduced its repurchases during the event window. To control for the magnitude of the payout reduction we include PAYOUT REDUCTION, which is measured as average payout during the crisis period minus the average payout during the pre-crisis period.
Firm size is an important determinant of payouts. Therefore, to control for firm size we include SIZE, which is measured as the log of total sales. [Insert Table III about here]
C.3. Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis three is analogous to hypothesis two but examines the stock performance of RR firms that reduced their share repurchase announcement values during the financial crisis period and compares these to the stock performance of RD firms that reduced dividends during the financial crisis period. Table IV [Insert Table IV about here] Overall, we find that there is support for the operational flexibility hypothesis. We find that the proportion of RR firms that did not announce repurchases is higher than the proportion of RD firms that reduced dividends during the financial crisis period. Consistent with operational flexibility we further find that the CARs of RR firms that did not announce repurchases (that announced lower repurchases amounts) are higher than the CARs of RD firms that reduced dividends during the financial crisis period.
C.4. Hypothesis Four
We hypothesize that the amount spent on actual 8 share repurchases (number of actual shares repurchased) by RR (OR) firms during the financial crisis will be lower than the amount spent on actual share repurchases (number of actual shares repurchased) by RR ( Table V-A 9 presents the results of our fourth hypothesis using the amount spent on repurchases scaled by total assets. Panel A and B provide the results for RR and OR. The mean 8 "Actual" refers to the information collected directly from the 10-q and 10-k reports rather than from COMPUSTAT. 9 We also tested hypothesis four by including only those firms that announced a repurchase program during the financial crisis and prior to the financial crisis. The results were similar.
(median) of the maximum amount spent by RR firms prior to the financial crisis was 10.29% of total assets (7.32% of total assets) and during the financial crisis were 8.29% of total assets (4.28% of total assets). The mean (median) of the maximum amount spent by OR firms prior to the financial crisis was 8.92% of total assets (6.51% of total assets) and during the financial crisis was 6.39% of total assets (2.64% of total assets). Appendix 2 provides an illustration for the calculation of the maximum. For all the panels, t-test, Wilcoxon test and the Kolmogorov Smirnov test suggest that the amount spent on repurchases by RR (OR) firms during crisis was lower than the amount spent on repurchases by RR (OR) firms prior to the financial crisis.
[Insert between those firms that completed their repurchase programs and those firms that did not complete their repurchase programs. We will utilize the observation during the financial crisis as our sample period to test this hypothesis. Hypothesis five examines whether such a premium exists or not. We will test hypothesis six in a similar manner to how we tested hypothesis two and three. First, we will test the equality in CARs using the t-test, the Wilcoxon's test, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Second, we will also use equation (2) with some modifications to explain the variation in CARs. Equation (3) will be used to explain the CARs for RR firms and equation (4) will be used to explain the CARs for OR firms.
where is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an RR firm completed all open market share repurchase programs during the financial crisis, and 0 otherwise. is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an OR firm completed all open market share repurchase program during the financial crisis, and 0 otherwise. If the market places a premium on actual repurchases during the financial crisis, then we expect the dummy variables and to be statistically significant and positively related to CARs. On the other hand, if reactive flexibility holds, then we expect the dummy variables to be not significant. Table VI presents Table VI suggest that the market does not differentiate a firm that completed its repurchase program from a firm that did not complete its repurchase program, which strongly supports the reactive flexibility hypothesis.
[Insert Table VI about here]
Overall, we find that there is robust support for reactive flexibility hypothesis. Table V-A presented the results of our fourth hypothesis where we expect that the amount spent on repurchases by firms during the financial crisis to be lower than the amount spent on repurchases by firms prior to the financial crisis. Table V-B presented the results of our fourth hypothesis where we expect that the number of shares repurchased by firms during the financial crisis to be lower than the number of shares repurchased by firms prior to the financial crisis. We find that results from V-A & V-B support our expectation that the amount spent on repurchases (the number of shares repurchased) during the financial crisis is lower than the amount spent on repurchases (the number of shares repurchased) prior to the financial crisis. Table VI presented the results of our fifth hypothesis where we expect that the CARs of RR (OR) firms that completed the repurchase program not to be different from the CARs of RR (OR) firms that did not complete the repurchase program. Results from table VI show that not more than 45% of the firms actually completed all their repurchase programs during the financial crisis. We also found that the CARs are not statistically different from each other. The regression results also show that the market does not favor a firm that completed its repurchase program than a firm that did not complete its repurchase program. The results from our fourth and fifth hypothesis overwhelmingly support the reactive flexibility hypothesis.
V. Conclusions
Fama and French published their paper on dividend substitution in 2001. Since then several papers have explored the issue of substitutability between dividends and share repurchases (Grullon and Michaely (2002); Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000 ) ).
Researchers have argued that the apparent flexibility of share repurchases motivates firms to payout a larger fraction of their overall payouts in the form of share repurchases than through dividends. The focus of these papers has largely been on what we term as operational flexibility.
In addition to operational flexibility, we identify two other types of flexibilities associated with repurchases: reactive and timing flexibility. In this paper we examine both operational and reactive flexibility of repurchases.
Operational flexibility refers to the ability of firms to decide whether to distribute cash to shareholders or to keep it in the firm (e.g., for investments). for the US economy but also for the global economy. It is a well-known and documented fact that many firms reduced payouts in response to the financial crisis. We use the financial crisis as an event to test the flexibility theory at the operational level and in a reactive sense. Hypotheses one through three explore the concept of operational flexibility. We examine whether regular share repurchasers were more flexible than regular dividend payers during the financial crisis.
Hypotheses four through six explore the concept of reactive flexibility, whereby we examine the ability of regular repurchasers and occasional repurchasers to alter their payout policy during the financial crisis.
To perform our analysis we need a sound classification system to categorize firms into different groups such as regular dividend payers, regular repurchasers, and occasional repurchasers. We rely on the Skinner (2008) classification system to categorize firms. However, in section IV we have identified some flaws associated with the Skinner classification system; hence we propose a new classification system, one that modifies the Skinner classification to rectify some of the shortcomings.
Survey evidence suggests that dividends are considered to be rigid. A firm that pays dividends is expected to pay (increase) the dividends in future or face adverse market reaction if it opts to reduce dividends. Therefore, once a firm starts paying dividends it becomes constrained by its choice. This choice to pay dividends may preclude the firm from investing in profitable ventures or conserving cash for future needs. Fearing adverse market reaction the dividend paying firms might opt not to reduce dividends whereas a repurchasing firm might not feel as constrained as a dividend paying firm and might decide freely to reduce repurchases. Since there were numerous reports in the business press during the financial crisis that payouts have almost disappeared, in our first hypothesis we set to explore which category of firms responded by reducing their payouts. We find that the regular repurchasers were aggressive in reducing payouts than were regular dividend payers, which provides supports for the operational flexibility theory. In our second and third hypothesis we aim to examine the stock market performance of regular dividends payers that reduced dividends during the financial crisis and the stock market performance of regular repurchasers that reduced repurchases. We find that the market reaction to dividend reductions is worse than the market reaction to regular repurchasing firms that reduce repurchases. The stock market performances of RD firms that reduced dividends is found to be lower than the stock market performances of RR firms that reduced repurchases. Our analysis supports operational flexibility, and proves that firms might feel restricted due to the choice to pay dividends than to repurchase shares and they may not reduce dividends as much as reducing repurchases.
Hypothesis four and five address the reactive flexibility of repurchases. We compare the behavior of regular (occasional) repurchasers prior to the financial crisis and during the financial crisis. In hypothesis four we compare the maximum amount spent on share repurchases scaled by total assets (the maximum number of shares repurchased scaled by the number of shares sought at the announcement) by regular repurchaser during the financial crisis to those of pre-crisis values. We find strong evidence that repurchasers spent less on actual repurchases (actually repurchased lower fraction of shares) during the financial crisis than during the pre-crisis period.
Hypothesis five examines whether the stock market differentiates the repurchasers that completed their repurchase programs during the financial crisis to those that did not. Open market repurchases by their very nature are not firm commitments; hence any delay in the open market repurchases will not be met with adverse market reaction. Our expectation, according to the reactive flexibility theory is that the stock market performance of firms that completed all of their repurchase programs during the financial crisis will not be different from the stock market performance of firms that did not complete all of their repurchase programs during the financial crisis. We do not find any evidence that the market treats differently the firms that completed their open market repurchase programs and firms that did not complete their open market repurchase programs. Our inability to reject the hypothesis further supports our contention that repurchases accord the firms with a sense of flexibility that even the market acknowledges.
Overall, we are able to conclude that repurchasers are more flexible than dividend payers.
The practical implication for firms that are thinking of initiating a payout program and for those firms that have already initiated a payout program is that repurchases are much more flexible than dividend payments. 
